Current published reading edition · 2026-02-04
Why Gauge Symmetry Cannot Be Ontic
Amos Jay Maley · 3 pages · Gauge representation and ontology
Using stated criteria of representation independence, additional constraint imposition and non-redundancy, the manuscript argues for a representational interpretation of gauge symmetry under locality and internal consistency. Its conclusion is a philosophical eliminative argument, preserving the usefulness of gauge descriptions. It is not presented as independently verified ontology or a blanket conclusion over other research.
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About this paper and citation
Amos Jay Maley. Why Gauge Symmetry Cannot Be Ontic. Published 2026-02-04. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18477390.
SHA256 f5f211267f209eebf91692db094f53d574bf4c4ad26ca6d716e9d1eeafd9c26f
Edition metadata · Work DOI · Exact publisher metadata
Complete short-source reading; no independent proof or ontological verification. Complete searchable PDF text was screened for circulation and completion notices, with marker contexts reviewed. The manuscript claims have not been independently verified. Equations, theorem numbering and full references remain in the original PDF. This page is a reading aid, not a full-text conversion.
Source references
Complete short source and declared scope
- Sections 1-2 target and ontic criteria · PDF page 1
- Sections 3-5 argument · PDF page 2
- Section 6 conditional boundary and conclusion · PDF page 3
A preferred reading edition does not replace an exact edition imported by a downstream theorem. Where references do not pin imported bytes, that identity remains unresolved.